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The cardinal principle of California water law is that all water rights, 
and all uses of water, must be reasonable. This seemingly simple and 
innocuous sentence masks a world of meaning and complexity, how-
ever, because the requirement of reasonable use embraces at least four 
interrelated concepts. The determination of reasonable water use is util-
itarian: the law seeks to encourage relatively effi  cient, economically and 
socially benefi cial uses of the state’s water resources. It is situational: the 
evaluation of individual reasonable use concerns not only the 
water right holder’s own uses but also other competing demands (both 
consumptive and ecological) on the water resource. The reasonable 
use doctrine is also dynamic: the defi nition of reasonable use varies as 
the economy, technology, demographics, hydrologic conditions, envi-
ronment, and societal needs evolve. And, because all uses of water 
must be consistent with this interdependent and variable defi nition of 
reasonable use, the law renders all water rights fragile. A water right 
that was reasonable when fi rst recognized, and which may have 
been exercised reasonably for many years, may become unreasonable as 
hydrologic conditions change, as California’s economy evolves, as 
population grows and new demands for water arise, as ecological 
needs are better understood, and as the environmental laws that 
protect the state’s aquatic ecosystems and native species are applied in 
ways that limit the impoundment and diversion of water for consump-
tive uses.
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The doctrine of reasonable use is thus both a policy mandate and a 
limitation on water rights. A part of California’s Constitution since 
1928, it applies to all branches of government, to all levels of govern-
mental administration of the state’s water resources, and to public and 
private uses of the state’s waters. Its overarching directives, comprehen-
sive reach, and infusion into the water rights system make it the most 
powerful of all of the laws that govern California’s water resources.1
the constitutional doctrine of 
reasonable use
Article X, section 2 of the California Constitution declares that, because 
of the state’s hydrologic and economic conditions, the general welfare 
requires that its water resources “be put to benefi cial use to the fullest 
extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable 
use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented.” It also stip-
ulates that “the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a 
view to the reasonable and benefi cial use thereof in the interest of the 
people and for the public welfare.”2
Article X, section 2 then ties the reasonable use requirement to the 
water right itself: “The right to water or to the use or fl ow of water in 
or from any natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be 
limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the benefi cial 
use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the 
waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreason-
able method of diversion of water.” It concludes with the statement that 
the amendment “shall be self-executing, and the Legislature may also 
enact laws in the furtherance of the policy in this section contained.”
In one of its early interpretations of article X, section 2, the California 
Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental purposes of the doctrine of 
reasonable use, explaining in Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935): “The 
waters of our streams are not like land which is static, can be measured 
and divided and the division remain the same. Water is constantly shift-
ing, and the supply changes to some extent every day. A stream supply 
may be divided but the product of the division in nowise remains the 
same. When the supply is limited public interest requires that there be 
the greatest number of benefi cial uses which the supply can yield.”
Three decades later, in a case that presaged the modern era in Cali-
fornia water law and policy, the court expressly linked these aspects of 
article X, section 2, to the defi nition of water rights.
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reasonable use and the property 
right in water
In Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District (1967), the Supreme Court 
rejected the claims of riparian landowners who harvested sand and 
gravel deposited by the natural fl ow of Nicasio Creek for commercial 
sale. The landowners alleged that the district violated their water rights 
by constructing a dam that impaired the natural fl ow and thus deprived 
them of the suspended materials carried by the water.
The court observed that, to prevail on their damages claim, the Joslins 
must “fi rst establish the legal existence of a compensable property interest” 
and that such an interest “consists in the right to a reasonable use of the 
fl ow of water.” Although evaluation of reasonable use “depends on the 
circumstances of each case,” the court reasoned, “such an inquiry cannot 
be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcend-
ent importance. Paramount among these [is] the increasing need for the 
conservation of water in this state, an inescapable reality of life quite apart 
from its express recognition in the 1928 amendment.” The court then con-
cluded that the Joslins’ reliance on the unimpaired fl ow had become unrea-
sonable in light of the new demands for municipal water supply. Moreo-
ver, “since there was and is no property right in an unreasonable use [of 
water] there has been no taking or damaging of property by the depriva-
tion of such use and, accordingly, the deprivation is not compensable.”
Although Joslin is sometimes read as a simple decision not to coun-
tenance a use of water that required an inordinate percentage of the 
fl ow of the stream, a closer reading reveals that the Supreme Court had 
broader purposes in mind. The opinion emphasized the utilitarian goals 
of the doctrine of reasonable use: to ensure that the state’s water 
resources are used in ways that serve the public interest, not just to ben-
efi t senior water right holders. Equally importantly, the court focused 
on the dynamic nature of the reasonable use inquiry and the consequent 
fragility of the property right in water. Water rights are defi ned by rea-
sonable use, and they are thereby limited by reasonable use. A use of 
water that may have been lawful when established—and that continued 
to be exercised lawfully for many years—may become unreasonable as 
conditions change. Moreover, because the property right in water is 
defi ned by contemporary standards of reasonable use, a water right (or 
certain aspects of the right) may cease to exist as a result of changes in 
hydrologic, economic, demographic, or environmental conditions that 
are well beyond the control of the water right holder.
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reasonable use and water rights 
administration
In the years following Joslin, the California courts applied the doctrine 
of reasonable use principally to enhance the regulatory jurisdiction of 
the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB). In In re Waters of 
Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979), the Supreme Court held that 
when the board conducts a statutory adjudication of all surface water 
rights, it has authority to relegate unexercised riparian rights to a prior-
ity below all active uses of water in the system—both riparian and 
appropriative.3 In People v. Shirokow (1980), the court ruled that a 
nonriparian water user may not claim prescriptive rights outside of the 
SWRCB’s permitting and licensing jurisdiction. Both decisions empha-
sized that the legislature had created the board for the express purpose 
of implementing and enforcing the constitutional reasonable use man-
dates.4 Assertions of previously dormant riparian rights to preempt 
valid existing uses and claims to water rights based on prescriptive use 
were unreasonable, the court concluded, because they created uncer-
tainty and undermined the SWRCB’s ability comprehensively to admin-
ister California’s surface water rights system.
In the wake of Joslin, the California Courts of Appeal also bolstered 
the SWRCB’s power directly to enforce the reasonable use doctrine. In 
People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board v. Forni (1976), the 
court held that the board had authority under Water Code section 275 
to enjoin vineyards along the Napa River from diverting water to spray 
on their crops during periods of low temperatures to prevent wine 
grapes from freezing. The lawsuit was based on the board’s determina-
tion that “direct diversion during the frost season may at times dry up 
the river and deprive many of the vineyardists of water which they need 
to protect their vines from frost” (Cal. Code Regs. Title 23, § 735). The 
court affi  rmed the board’s decision to compel all vineyards—including 
those that diverted water pursuant to riparian rights—to construct stor-
age to minimize aggregate demands on the available water. According 
to the court, the “overriding constitutional consideration is to put the 
water resources of the state to a reasonable use and make them availa-
ble for the constantly increasing needs of all the people. In order to 
attain this objective, the riparian owners may properly be required to 
endure some inconvenience or to incur reasonable expenses.”
In Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control 
Board (1986, 1990), the court upheld the SWRCB’s fi nding that the 
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Imperial Irrigation District’s unlined canals and lack of regulating reser-
voirs were causing fl ooding and waste of water within its service area. 
It also rejected the irrigation district’s argument that, as a pre-1914 
appropriator, it was not subject to the SWRCB’s regulatory author-
ity. As in Forni, the court held that section 275 conferred independent 
jurisdiction on the board to enforce the reasonable use mandates of 
article X, section 2. Faced with the prospect of losing a substantial por-
tion of its water rights, the district agreed to a 35-year transfer of more 
than 100,000 acre-feet of conserved water each year to the Metropoli-
tan Water District of Southern California.5
The courts also have affi  rmed the SWRCB’s assertion of its reasona-
ble use powers to set water quality and fl ow standards for the Sacra-
mento–San Joaquin Delta and to establish operational constraints on 
the Central Valley Project, the State Water Project, and other water 
right holders as required to protect water quality, fi sheries, and other 
instream uses in the Delta ecosystem. In United States v. State Water 
Resources Control Board (1986), the Court of Appeal again empha-
sized the multifaceted and dynamic nature of article X, section 2:
We perceive no legal obstacle to the Board’s determination that particular 
methods of use have become unreasonable by their deleterious eff ects upon 
water quality. Obviously, some accommodation must be reached concerning 
the major public interests at stake: the quality of valuable water resources 
and transport of adequate supplies for needs southward. The decision is 
essentially a policy judgment requiring a balancing of the competing public 
interests, one the Board is uniquely qualifi ed to make in view of its special 
knowledge and expertise and its combined statewide responsibility to allo-
cate the rights to, and to control the quality of, state water resources.
The court concluded that the “power to prevent unreasonable methods 
of use should be broadly interpreted to enable the Board to strike the 
proper balance between the interests in water quality and project activ-
ities in order to objectively determine whether a reasonable method of 
use is manifested.”
Finally, in something of a sequel to Forni, the Court of Appeal 
recently affi  rmed the SWRCB’s power to regulate the diversion of water 
from the Russian River system—including most of its tributaries and all 
hydrologically connected groundwater—to protect coho salmon. The 
board determined that simultaneous diversions and pumping by vine-
yards for frost-prevention purposes were unreasonable because the 
aggregate withdrawal of water caused migrating juvenile salmon to 
become stranded in the river bed. In Light v. State Water Resources 
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Control Board (2014), the court held that the board could include 
riparians and pre-1914 appropriators (including those that extract 
hydrologically connected groundwater from the river system) within 
this regulatory scheme: “That the Board cannot require riparian users 
and pre-1914 appropriators to obtain a permit before making reason-
able benefi cial use of water does not mean the Board cannot prevent 
them from making unreasonable use. Any other rule would eff ectively 
read Article X, Section 2 out of the Constitution.”
the reasonable use doctrine and 
environmental quality
The California Supreme Court’s most important applications of the rea-
sonable use doctrine following Joslin came in two high-profi le cases 
that pitted municipal water use against environmental protection. In 
Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District 
(1980), the court held that environmental advocates may rely on article 
X, section 2, to claim that a proposed upstream point of diversion for 
water supplied by the CVP to the East Bay Municipal Utility District 
was unreasonable because of its adverse eff ects on water quality, fi sh 
and wildlife, and recreational uses in the lower American River. Three 
years later, in its landmark opinion in the Mono Lake litigation, the 
court held that the mandate of reasonable use also embraces the public 
trust, an ancient doctrine that protects recreational access, boating, fi sh-
ing, and ecological uses of the state’s navigable waters.
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983), the Supreme 
Court ruled that Los Angeles’s long-standing rights to appropriate 
water from the streams that supply Mono Lake are subject to the public 
trust. Just as the doctrine of reasonable use serves as an inherent limita-
tion on the exercise of all water rights, the court declared that the public 
trust doctrine “imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking 
and use of the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to 
allocate water resources in the public interest, the state is not confi ned 
by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current 
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.”
Although Audubon is best known as the case in which the Supreme 
Court incorporated the public trust doctrine into California’s water 
rights system, it is equally important as a reasonable use decision. First, 
the court explained that, although the public trust doctrine and the water 
rights laws “developed independently of each other,” its integration of 
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the two would bring both under the umbrella of article X, section 2. The 
constitutional amendment “establishes state water policy. All uses of 
water, including public trust uses, must now conform to the standard of 
reasonable use.”
Second, the court recognized that water rights do not exist in isolation 
from the broader society and environment. In its earlier reasonable use 
decisions, the paramount goal was conservation of scarce water resources 
to accommodate new consumptive demands as California’s population 
and economy continued to grow. In Audubon, the court built on its 
Environmental Defense Fund holding and emphasized that fi sh, wildlife, 
recreation, and other in-stream uses that depend on that same water are 
also important societal interests that must be taken into account.
Third, the Audubon court’s articulation of the evolving nature of the 
public trust was consonant with its dynamic conception of the doctrine 
of reasonable use. Both laws recognize that “the state is not confi ned by 
past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current 
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.”
Fourth, this dynamic feature means that water rights are mutable 
under both the reasonable use and public trust doctrines. Joslin held 
that there “is no property right in an unreasonable use of water” and 
that the defi nition of “what constitutes reasonable water use is depend-
ent upon not only the entire circumstances presented but varies as the 
current situation changes.” Audubon embellished these principles, 
emphasizing that the law “prevents any party from acquiring a vested 
right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests pro-
tected by the public trust.”
legislative declarations of reasonable use
The legislature also has exercised its constitutional authority under arti-
cle X, section 2, to declare that certain environmental uses of Califor-
nia’s water resources are reasonable. For example, section 1243 of the 
Water Code states that “the use of water for recreation and preservation 
and enhancement of fi sh and wildlife resources is a benefi cial use of 
water.” Similarly, the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act provides: 
“It is the policy of the State of California that certain rivers which pos-
sess extraordinary scenic, recreational, fi shery, or wildlife values shall 
be preserved in their free-fl owing state, together with their immediate 
environments, for the benefi t and enjoyment of the people of the state. 
The Legislature declares that such use of these rivers is the highest and 
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most benefi cial use and is a reasonable and benefi cial use of water 
within the meaning of Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitu-
tion” (Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 5093.50).
More recently, the legislature exercised its reasonable use authority to 
enact the Delta Reform Act of 2009, which established a Delta Steward-
ship Council to formulate a Delta Plan and to oversee actions that may 
aff ect the waters and resources of the Delta ecosystem. The act declares 
that waters of the Sacramento–San Joaquin River and Delta system shall 
be administered to achieve the “co-equal goals” of “providing a more 
reliable water supply for California and protecting, restoring, and 
enhancing the Delta ecosystem” (Cal. Water Code §§ 85020, 85054). 
The legislature also stated that the “longstanding constitutional principle 
of reasonable use and the public trust doctrine shall be the foundation of 
state water management policy and are particularly important and appli-
cable to the Delta” (§ 85023).
In California Trout v. SWRCB (1989), the Court of Appeal upheld 
the legislature’s authority to make these types of categorical declara-
tions of reasonable use. One of California’s oldest environmental pro-
tection statutes directs that the “owner of any dam shall allow suffi  cient 
water at all times to pass through a fi shway, or in the absence of a fi sh-
way, allow suffi  cient water to pass over, around or through the dam, to 
keep in good condition any fi sh that may be planted or exist below the 
dam” (Fish and Game Code § 5937). The court rejected the claim that 
this statute violates article X, section 2. It emphasized that the Constitu-
tion expressly authorizes the legislature to enact laws in furtherance of 
the policy of reasonable use and held that where “various alternative 
policy views reasonably might be held whether the use of water is rea-
sonable within the meaning of article X, section 2, the view enacted by 
the Legislature is entitled to deference by the judiciary.”
the reasonable use doctrine and water 
allocation
Although the SWRCB and the courts have authority under the reason-
able use doctrine to reallocate water (out of priority) between water 
right holders, and to require consumptive users to provide more water 
to environmental uses, the relationship between water rights priorities 
and reasonable use continues to raise questions.
In its most recent groundwater rights case, City of Barstow v. Mojave 
Water Agency (2000), the California Supreme Court overturned a decision 
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Statutory Encouragement of 
Effi  cient Water Use
The legislature has enacted a variety of statutes that are designed to 
encourage more effi  cient use of the state’s waters. For example:
• It has declared that the cessation or reduction in the extraction of 
groundwater—either as a result of the use of alternative sources 
or to allow for the replenishment of the aquifer—is a reasonable 
and benefi cial use (Water Code §§ 1005.1–1005.4).
• It has stated that the cessation or reduction in the use of water 
made possible by the substitution of recycled, desalinated, 
or treated polluted water is a reasonable benefi cial use 
(§§ 1010(a)).
• It has mandated similar treatment for cessations or reductions in 
water use because of conservation or the use of groundwater that 
is managed as part of a conjunctive use program (§§ 1011(a), 
1011.5(a)).
• It has authorized the transfer of water that is made available by 
conservation or the substitution of these alternative sources and 
has guaranteed that the transferor’s rights to the transferred water 
will be protected and preserved during the term of the transfer 
agreement (§§ 1010(b), 1011(b), 1011.5(b), 1014–1017).
• It has required municipal water agencies to meter and report on 
water use, and it has required agricultural supply agencies to 
monitor and report on groundwater levels (§§ 500–535, 10920–
10936).
• It has authorized counties and local agencies to conjunctively 
manage surface and groundwater supplies and has required urban 
and agricultural water agencies to adopt best management 
practices to promote conservation and effi  cient use (§§ 10608–
10608.64, 10610–10656, 10750–10783.2, 10800–10853).
The legislature also has granted public water agencies authority to 
use “allocation-based conservation water pricing”—i.e., tiered water 
pricing—which it identifi ed as “one eff ective means by which waste or 
unreasonable use of water can be prevented and water can be saved in 
the interest of the people and for the public welfare, within the con-
templation of Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution” 
(§§ 370–374).
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that “equitably apportioned” the safe yield of an overdrafted groundwater 
basin among all water right holders regardless of the type or priority of 
water right. “We have never,” the court stated, “endorsed a pure equitable 
apportionment that completely disregards overlying owners’ existing legal 
rights.”
Yet, the court also rejected the view that priority of water right alone 
should determine which users should curtail their pumping and which 
may continue. It confi rmed the broad holding of Joslin that article X, 
section 2, “dictates the basic principles defi ning water rights: that no 
one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water, and 
that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and benefi cially.” 
Although “water right priority has long been the central principle in Cali-
fornia water law, . . . the corollary of this rule is that an equitable physical 
solution must preserve water right priorities to the extent those priorities 
do not lead to unreasonable use.” In crafting a “physical solution” to the 
problem of aggregate overdraft, the court concluded, a trial court “may 
neither change priorities among the water rights holders nor eliminate 
vested rights in applying the solution without fi rst considering them in 
relation to the reasonable use doctrine” (emphasis added).
The two other courts that have confronted this question of the rela-
tionship between water rights priorities and reasonable use have followed 
this approach. In El Dorado Irrigation District v. State Water Resources 
Control Board (2006), the Court of Appeal overturned a decision by the 
board that required all permittees and licensees in the Sacramento River 
basin to cease diversions whenever the CVP or SWP are releasing stored 
water to meet Delta water quality standards—regardless of the appro-
priator’s priority vis-à-vis the two projects. The court explained that 
“sometimes the use of water under a claim of prior right must yield to the 
need to preserve water quality to protect public trust interests, and con-
tinued use under those circumstances may be deemed unreasonable.” If, 
for example, “El Dorado’s diversions of natural fl ow contribute to the 
degradation of water quality in the Delta, the Board has a legitimate 
interest in requiring [the district] to reduce its diversions to contribute 
toward the maintenance and improvement of water quality in the Delta.”
The court cautioned, however, that the board must respect the rela-
tive water rights priorities:
When the Board seeks to ensure that water quality objectives are met in order 
to enforce the rule against unreasonable use and the public trust doctrine, the 
Board must attempt to preserve water right priorities to the extent those pri-
orities do not lead to unreasonable use or violation of public trust values. In 
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other words, in such circumstances the subversion of a water right priority is 
justifi ed only if enforcing that priority will in fact lead to the unreasonable 
use of water or result in harm to values protected by the public trust.
The Court of Appeal also recently grappled with the question of prior-
ity of water rights in the context of the Russian River adjudication. It 
acknowledged that when “the supply of water is insuffi  cient to satisfy 
all persons and entities holding water rights, it is ordinarily the function 
of the rule of priority to determine the degree to which any particular 
use must be curtailed. Yet even in these circumstances, the Board has the 
ultimate authority to allocate water in a manner inconsistent with the 
rule of priority, when doing so is necessary to prevent the unreasonable 
use of water” (Light v. SWRCB, 2014). This is especially true, the court 
stated, when the board is acting to protect the public trust. It added, 
quoting El Dorado, that because “‘no one can have a protectible inter-
est in the unreasonable use of water’ . . . when the rule of priority 
clashes with the rule against unreasonable use of water, the latter must 
prevail.”
These cases add an important caveat to the law of reasonable use. 
Although all water rights are defi ned by reasonable use and must be 
exercised reasonably in light of contemporary conditions and standards, 
the doctrine does not apply carte blanche. Aggregate unreasonable use 
(such as groundwater overdraft or harm to water quality or fi sheries) 
does not necessarily mean that every water user is acting unreasonably. 
Nor does it mean that the SWRCB and the courts may necessarily require 
pro rata reductions in water use or impose equal conditions on all water 
users regardless of their relative priority of right. While the reasonable 
use doctrine grants the board and the courts broad powers to correct the 
overall problem, the remedies applied to each water user must be more 
nuanced. The trier of fact must make individualized determinations of 
reasonable use and must be guided by the rule of priority. As all three of 
these cases make clear, the SWRCB and the courts may depart from the 
underlying water rights priorities only if they justify their decisions on 
fi ndings of individual unreasonable use vis-à-vis the other potentially 
aff ected water right holders. The reasonable use doctrine is powerful, but 
it is not a magic wand.
the future of reasonable use
Although there is no single response to the challenges of California water 
management in the twenty-fi rst century, the reasonable use doctrine will 
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play an important role in helping to eff ectuate a variety of necessary 
improvements in California water policy.
Prevention of Waste and Improvements in 
the Effi  ciency of Water Use
The state has estimated that available improvements in the effi  ciency of 
water use could conserve between 180,000 and 1.1 million acre-feet per 
year in the agricultural sector and 1.2 million to 2.1 million acre-feet per 
year currently used for municipal and industrial purposes (California 
Bay-Delta Authority 2005). Although this analysis probably underesti-
mates the statewide water conservation potential, it does suggest that 
many water-use practices may be unreasonable in light of the existing 
strains on the state’s developed water supplies and the future diminution 
in useable supplies that is a predicted consequence of climate change.
The state—acting principally through the SWRCB or the courts—has 
authority to investigate individual cases of unreasonable use and to 
declare unreasonable a variety of water practices that may have been 
acceptable in the past, but which are no longer tolerable in the face of 
contemporary and future water supply challenges. These may include 
excessive evaporative and conveyance losses, ineffi  cient irrigation tech-
niques, failure to adopt or to implement best management practices, 
and perhaps other profl igate uses such as the irrigation of water-inten-
sive crops and landscaping. Future unreasonable use also may include 
excessive reliance on imported water instead of shifting to a more var-
ied water portfolio that incudes cost-eff ective alternatives such as 
demand reduction, use of recharged groundwater, and recycling of 
reclaimed wastewater.
The Delta Watermaster has issued a report to the SWRCB and the 
Delta Stewardship Council advocating greater enforcement of the rea-
sonable use doctrine to address wasteful water practices and to create 
incentives to achieve more effi  cient water use (Wilson 2010). “The 
underlying premise of this report,” he stated, “is that the ineffi  cient use 
of water is an unreasonable use of water.” The Watermaster then pro-
vided examples of a variety of currently available agricultural water 
management practices that could be required to promote the reasonable 
use of water, including “weather-based and defi cit irrigation scheduling, 
water distribution systems that can supply water to farmers ‘on-demand,’ 
and improved irrigation methods, such as substituting drip and sprin-
kler irrigation for fl ood irrigation.”
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The report provides a template for focused and proactive application 
of the reasonable use doctrine to promote greater effi  ciency in water 
use. Although the report addressed only agricultural water practices, 
there is a signifi cant role for reasonable use investigations of water use 
in California’s urban and suburban areas as well. There exists the poten-
tial for signifi cant water savings, especially in irrigation of landscaping 
and other outdoor uses (Hanak et al. 2011, 171–73).
Regional Water Management, Water Pricing, 
and Water Use Effi  ciency
In the Delta Reform Act of 2009, the legislature declared a state policy 
“to reduce reliance on the Delta in meeting California’s future water 
supply needs through a statewide strategy of investing in improved 
regional supplies, conservation, and water use effi  ciency” (Cal. Water 
Code § 85021). It then directed that “each region that depends on water 
from the Delta watershed shall improve its regional self-reliance for 
water through investment in water use effi  ciency, water recycling, 
advanced water technologies, local and regional water supply projects, 
and improved regional coordination of local and regional water supply 
eff orts.” A variety of statutes empower local and regional agencies to 
promote greater effi  ciency in water use. These include the requirements 
that municipal water agencies meter and report on water use (Cal. 
Water Code §§ 500–535), that agricultural water agencies monitor and 
report on groundwater levels (§§ 10920–10936), and that agencies 
adopt urban and agricultural water management plans that include best 
practices to promote conservation and effi  cient use (§§ 10608–
10608.64, 10610–10656, 10750–10783.2, 10800–10853). The legisla-
ture also has authorized (with voter approval) more than $2 billion in 
bond funding to support forty-six integrated regional water manage-
ment programs that allow cities, counties, and other agencies to coordi-
nate their water supply, water management, and fl ood control eff orts 
(Hanak et al. 2011, 365–68). All of these laws build on the constitu-
tional mandate that California’s water resources be administered to 
promote reasonable, and reasonably effi  cient, water use.
Water pricing also plays an important role in encouraging reasonable 
use. The legislature has authorized public water agencies to adopt “allo-
cation-based conservation water pricing” (Cal. Water Code §§ 370–
374). The agency may set a base rate that is designed to cover its fi xed 
costs and then one or more higher rates that increase with volume of 
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water use. Tiered rate structures create incentives for conservation and 
more effi  cient use, because the cost per unit of water rises as each cus-
tomer’s demands increase (Hanak et al. 2011, 270–73). Agencies with 
allocation-based tiers typically use revenues from the upper tiers to fund 
conservation programs within their service area. Since the legislature’s 
express authorization of allocation-based conservation pricing in 2008, 
a number of water supply agencies have adopted tiered rates (Hanak et 
al. 2011, 270–73).
Although enacted pursuant to article X, section 2, tiered rate pricing 
has raised questions under article XIIID of the California Constitution, 
which was passed by the voters in 1996 as Proposition 218. This law 
provides inter alia that water rates “shall not exceed the proportional 
cost of the service” attributable to each parcel of land that receives 
water service (Cal. Const. art. XIIID, § 6(b)(3)).
In City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water District (2011), the California 
Court of Appeal invalidated a tiered-rate structure that set diff erent 
rates (and diff erent percentage increases between tiers) for residential, 
commercial, and irrigation customers. The court recognized that the 
district had adopted the tiered rates for the purpose of encouraging 
conservation and effi  cient use, consistent with the constitutional reason-
able use mandate as well as the legislature’s authorization of allocation-
based conservation pricing. It explained, however, that “article X, sec-
tion 2 is not at odds with Article IIID so long as . . . conservation is 
attained in a manner that ‘shall not exceed the proportional cost of the 
service attributable to the parcel.’” The court concluded that the district 
had not explained “why [these other laws] cannot be harmonized with 
Proposition 218 and its mandate for proportionality. PWD [Palmdale 
Water District] fails to identify any support in the record for the ine-
quality between tiers, depending on the category of user.”
The court’s insistence on a cost-based justifi cation of water rates and 
rate diff erentials may well be required by Proposition 218, but overly 
strict judicial interpretations of the law will present challenges for con-
temporary water administration. Allocation-based conservation pricing 
is one of the most direct and proactive means of implementing article X, 
section 2’s goals of conservation and effi  cient use. It accomplishes these 
goals through price incentives, rather than government fi at; and it fairly 
distributes the costs of water service by requiring those who use the 
most to pay the most. The question in these types of cases should not be 
how to ensure that article X, section 2, “is not at odds with” Proposition 
218, but how to ensure that the ratemaking strictures of Proposition 218 
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do not undermine the most important principles of California water law 
and policy (Gray et al. 2014).
Integrated Management of Groundwater and 
Surface Water Resources
One of the most vexing problems in California water law is the anti-
quated separation between the law of surface water rights and the law 
governing groundwater (Sax 2003; Hanak et al. 2011, 322–28). 
Although there is now integrated management of surface and ground-
water resources in twenty-two adjudicated groundwater basins and spe-
cial groundwater management districts, many problems remain (see 
chapter 8 in this volume).
The most logical and direct response to these problems would be for 
the legislature to enact a statute empowering the SWRCB to exercise 
integrated permitting and regulatory authority over surface and ground-
water rights. There is no question of the legislature’s power to do this 
under article X, section 2. With limited exceptions, however, it is unlikely 
to occur.6
Yet, the courts have their own constitutional reasonable use authority 
to address problems of groundwater overdraft and confl ict between sur-
face and groundwater uses. For example, the physical solution and fi nal 
judgment in the Mojave adjudication included rights to both groundwater 
and surface water, based on the trial court’s determination that the two 
are hydrologically connected: diversions from the river reduce groundwa-
ter recharge, and groundwater pumping reduces the volume and fl ow of 
water in the river. Indeed, the water management system that the judg-
ment created places a water replacement charge on all water extraction 
that exceeds each user’s “free production allowance.” The revenues from 
these charges are used to fund the acquisition of imported surface water 
to augment and replenish the native groundwater supplies (Littleworth 
and Garner 2007).
This integrated management of surface water and groundwater sup-
plies established an important precedent: that the courts have authority 
under article X, section 2, to unify the law of surface and groundwater 
rights situationally where unintegrated management and regulation would 
result in unreasonable use. And the courts have this constitutional power 
despite the general legal distinction between the surface water and ground-
water systems. Indeed, as a result of earlier groundwater adjudications 
and special legislation, integrated surface and groundwater management is 
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now an important feature of regional water administration in several parts 
of California. These include the Orange County Water District, the Water 
Replenishment District of Southern California, the Santa Clara Valley 
Water Agency, and a number of smaller districts that manage adjudicated 
groundwater basins (Blomquist 1992).
The SWRCB’s assertion of its article X, section 2, authority to limit 
surface water diversions and groundwater withdrawals from the Rus-
sian River system to protect coho salmon is another example of how the 
reasonable use doctrine can facilitate integrated water management. If 
the board were confi ned to its direct authority over surface water per-
mittees and licensees, its eff orts to protect the salmon would be frus-
trated. Not only would riparians and groundwater right holders be 
exempt, but those appropriators who are subject to the regulation could 
simply shift from surface water diversions to groundwater pumping and 
evade the restrictions. The aggregate eff ect would be to place an already 
endangered species in further jeopardy of extinction, which would 
unquestionably be an unreasonable exercise of water rights. As the 
Court of Appeal recognized in Light v. SWRCB, integrated surface and 
groundwater regulation in this context is therefore an appropriate and 
necessary exercise of the SWRCB’s reasonable use powers.7
Incentives for Water Conservation and Transfer
Many of the important reasonable use cases have involved reallocations 
of water from senior water right holders whose existing uses or methods 
of use had become unreasonable in light of new consumptive demands 
on the resource or new environmental requirements. The courts in these 
cases have consistently held that an unreasonable use of water—unrea-
sonable under contemporary standards—may not be asserted to block 
the new use or to obtain compensation from the new user. Although 
these principles are a sine qua non of reasonable use, some water users, 
economists, and policymakers have criticized the doctrine for rendering 
water rights uncertain. This uncertainty is harmful, they argue, because 
it may deter investment and marketability: “If current owners of water 
rights do not have secure rights—even if the lack of security serves per-
fectly valid public purposes—they will have a diffi  cult time fi nding buy-
ers for those rights” (Haddad 2000, 41).
Properly administered, however, the reasonable use doctrine can place 
constructive pressure on existing water users not to waste water and to 
encourage the profi table transfer of water from potentially unreasonable 
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uses. Indeed, California’s two most prominent water transfers resulted 
from this interplay between reasonable use and the market.
As described above, in 1984 the SWRCB made a determination of 
unreasonable use against the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), fi nding 
that the district’s unlined canals and lack of regulating reservoirs in its 
water distribution system were causing both waste of water and fl ood-
ing of land adjacent to the Salton Sea. The board ordered the district to 
correct these problems and to conserve a minimum of 100,000 acre-feet 
per year. With its water rights in jeopardy of reduction, the district 
agreed to line its canals, construct regulating reservoirs, and make oper-
ational improvements to its distribution system. These conservation 
actions would be funded, however, by the Metropolitan Water District 
(MWD) as payment for a 35-year transfer of 106,110 acre-feet per year 
from the IID to the MWD (Gray 1994). The SWRCB could have simply 
divested the IID of its water rights to the extent of unreasonable use, but 
it chose not to do so in favor of the more constructive solution pre-
sented in the IID–MWD transfer.8
The waste and unreasonable-use laws also served as a catalyst for a 
subsequent transfer of conserved water from IID to the San Diego 
County Water Authority. Following years of focus on California’s 
excessive use of water from the Colorado River, the U.S. Bureau of Rec-
lamation made a formal fi nding that farmers within the IID were wast-
ing water. Based on this fi nding, the bureau determined that the district 
was in violation of the benefi cial use requirement of federal reclamation 
law, which includes a reasonable use standard, and it ordered a reduc-
tion in water deliveries to the IID of approximately 8 percent. This deci-
sion broke a decade-long deadlock in negotiations among the Depart-
ment of the Interior, the IID, the MWD, and the SDCWA. Two months 
later, the Southern California water agencies pledged to reduce their use 
of Colorado River water by 800,000 acre-feet per year over the next 14 
years. This Quantifi cation Settlement Agreement (QSA) brought Cali-
fornia into compliance with the 4.4 million acre-feet per year limit of 
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, which governs the allocation of Colo-
rado River water among Arizona, California, and Nevada. In the QSA, 
IID also agreed to conserve and transfer 277,000 acre-feet per year to 
SDCWA for a period of 35 years (Gray 2005).9
The IID transfers were the product of the state and federal govern-
ments’ enforcement of the mandate of reasonable use. The SWRCB and 
the Department of the Interior applied the doctrine of reasonable use 
aggressively, but also fl exibly, to give IID and its members a choice: 
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forfeit their water rights to the extent of unreasonable use, or correct 
the problem and benefi t economically from the conservation and trans-
fer of their previously wasteful practices. Application of the reasonable 
use doctrine in this context thus served three salutary purposes. It 
induced the conservation and more effi  cient conveyance and use of 
water within IID. It led to the transfer of the conserved water to higher-
valued uses within MWD and SDCWA. And it reduced MWD’s and 
SDCWA’s long-term demands for water from both the Colorado River 
and other sources (such as the Delta or new water projects in the Sierra 
Nevada).
One of the goals of the modern water transfer statutes is to create 
economic incentives for water right holders and their derivative users to 
conserve water and to transfer that water to higher-valued uses by pre-
senting them with the opportunity costs of their existing uses—that is, 
by showing them that they may earn more revenue from selling water 
than they can through their own uses. Enforcement of the reasonable 
use mandate to induce these types of transfers is an important means of 
eff ectuating these statutory policies and should become a more promi-
nent feature of California’s eff orts to foster greater effi  ciency in water 
use and water allocation. The two IID transfers are a model for this 
vital synergy between water transfers and reasonable use.
Compliance with Environmental Standards and 
Protection of the Public Trust
The reasonable use doctrine also serves the important purpose of help-
ing to implement and enforce the public trust and the other environ-
mental laws that protect water quality, endangered species, aquatic 
habitat, and other in situ uses. These laws establish fundamental limita-
tions on the amount of water that water right holders may impound 
and divert from California’s rivers, lakes, and estuaries.
Federal statutes, such as the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et 
seq.) and the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.), are 
preemptive of California water rights law, as are the water quality 
standards, biological opinions, and other regulations and administra-
tive actions that implement them. California’s environmental laws also 
take precedence over water rights in the event of confl ict. The environ-
mental baselines these laws establish defi ne the quantity of water avail-
able for impoundment and diversion (In re Bay-Delta Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 2008).
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Yet, some courts have struggled to understand the relationship 
between environmental mandates and the reasonable use doctrine as a 
limit on the exercise of water rights. For example, in Tulare Lake Water 
Storage District v. United States (2001), the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims ruled that restrictions on SWP operations required by biological 
opinions issued under the federal Endangered Species Act to protect 
winter-run Chinook salmon and Delta smelt were a taking of property, 
because the operational constraints caused water shortages for some 
SWP contractors. The court ordered the United States to pay the con-
tractors approximately $26 million in damages. Although the court 
noted that the reasonable use and public trust doctrines might preclude 
the appropriation of water under conditions that would imperil endan-
gered species of fi sh, it declined to consider either aspect of California 
water rights law as part of its analysis.
Similarly, in Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States (2008), 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the United 
States’s directive that a local water district allow water to pass through 
a fi sh ladder was a taking of property. The releases of water were needed 
to support migration of steelhead, which are also protected under the 
federal ESA. The court reasoned that the federal government had phys-
ically diverted the plaintiff ’s water for its own purposes—protection of 
the endangered fi sh. The court never addressed the question of whether 
California’s reasonable use and public trust doctrines might limit the 
plaintiff ’s exercise of its water rights in a manner that could harm the 
protected fi sh.10
Yet, analysis of the reasonable use doctrine in these settings should be 
straightforward, both for the advocates of environmental protection and 
for the courts. Article X, section 2, declares as a matter of California 
constitutional and property rights law that existing uses of water are 
unlawful if they cause unreasonable harm to water quality, fi sh, aquatic 
ecosystems, or other in-stream benefi cial uses. Not only does the state 
have a duty to enforce the reasonable use mandate, but it may do so 
without violating the water rights of those users who must reduce their 
impoundment and diversion of water, limit discharges, or otherwise alter 
their water use practices to comply with this supervening law. As Joslin 
and its progeny make clear, because there is no valid property right in an 
unreasonable use, when the state acts to abate water practices that unrea-
sonably harm the environment it may do so without compensation.
Although an adjudicatory reasonable use determination always 
requires an assessment of the competing interests, it is diffi  cult to 
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imagine a case in which a court would fi nd reasonable a use of water 
that violates water quality standards or jeopardizes the continued exist-
ence of endangered or threatened species. As described above, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal has held that statutes that allocate water to 
environmental uses, or which place limits on the impoundment and 
diversion of water to protect against environmental harm, are presump-
tively reasonable and are entitled to signifi cant deference (California 
Trout v. SWRCB, 1989). Conversely, uses of water that violate state 
and federal environmental laws—or the water quality and streamfl ow 
standards, effl  uent limits, biological opinions, incidental take limits, 
and other regulations that implement those laws—should be presump-
tively unreasonable and a substantial burden placed on the water right 
holder to prove otherwise.
Constructive Pressure to Reform
The reasonable use doctrine will continue to be a vital component of 
California water policy. It is the foundation of the state’s water rights 
system and applies to all water rights. It confers authority on all branches 
and levels of government to ensure that water is used reasonably (and 
reasonably effi  ciently) to maximize the general welfare of Californians. 
This includes drinking-water supplies and economic uses, as well as the 
environment. The reasonable use doctrine (sometimes working in tan-
dem with the public trust) therefore serves to ensure that the impound-
ment and diversion of the state’s waters for consumptive uses do not 
degrade aquatic ecosystems or harm the aquatic and terrestrial species 
that also depend on these waters.
Some future applications of the reasonable use mandate will be obvi-
ous. As discussed in the preceding subsection, assertion of the doctrine 
both to protect endangered fi sh and to limit the exercise of water rights 
that threaten to jeopardize such species is one example. Another obvi-
ous (and perhaps easy) application of the reasonable use mandate would 
be to restrict the groundwater pumping on the west side of the San 
Joaquin Valley that has caused overdraft and compaction of local aqui-
fers, with attendant land subsidence of almost 30 feet. This overdraft 
and subsidence now threaten the geologic stability and fl ow capabilities 
of the Delta-Mendota Canal and the California Aqueduct, which deliver 
irrigation water to approximately 3 million acres of farmland in the San 
Joaquin Valley and Tulare Basin and to more than 16 million residen-
tial, commercial, and industrial customers in Southern California (U.S. 
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Geological Survey 2013). This is a compelling example of the state’s 
obligation to enforce the doctrine of reasonable use for the benefi t of 
California’s people and economy.
In less egregious situations, the reasonable use doctrine is likely to 
play a more indirect role in improving water management and water 
use. The Delta Watermaster’s call for an investigation of irrigation prac-
tices is an excellent beginning. Coupled with the statutes that protect 
existing users’ rights to conserved water and allow them to transfer water 
made available through voluntary conservation, such investigations 
could induce some farmers and irrigation-water managers to correct 
wasteful practices and perhaps even profi t from their reforms. Presented 
with both the opportunity costs of their existing uses and the threat of 
loss of water rights for failure to act, these users may choose to do the 
right thing. The two IID transfers of conserved water are useful templates 
for this type of interplay between reasonable use and market incentives.
Moreover, some environmental groups have suggested that the state 
should assert its reasonable use authority against those who irrigate 
water-intensive crops, such as alfalfa and pasture (Natural Resources 
Defense Council 1996). The doctrine also could be used to put pressure 
on municipal water agencies and their customers to minimize their use 
of water for landscaping and other outdoor uses. Whether state and 
local regulators would have the will to take such actions is an open 
question. As the foregoing demonstrates, however, the reasonable use 
mandates clearly apply to uses that demand an inordinate share of the 
available water in light of contemporary competing demands. It should 
not matter in this context whether the excessive demands are the result 
of an unreasonable point of diversion, method of conveyance, or place 
of use, or are caused by the type of use to which the water is put.
The doctrine of reasonable use may therefore be best understood as 
a source of pressure on all water users to exercise their rights in a man-
ner that accounts for the eff ects of their water-use practices on other 
existing and potential uses—both consumptive and environmental—
and that keeps pace with the times. Although the law may not necessar-
ily require that individual water uses be as effi  cient as technology per-
mits, or that water uses be changed to ensure optimal allocation 
(however that might be determined), the doctrine does set an enforcea-
ble standard of reasonably effi  cient use and reasonably effi  cient alloca-
tion as current conditions warrant. A consistent and palpable threat of 
regulatory enforcement of reasonable use may serve as a constructive 
inducement to better water use and more optimal allocation.
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conclusion
Toward the end of his life, Wallace Stegner looked back over a century 
of water resources policy and wrote: “The West cannot carry what it 
has lifted. It will make heroic eff orts, always in the direction of more 
grandiose engineering works, and in the end it will subside back to what 
it was meant to be, an oasis civilization with one great defi ciency—
water.” We need, he concluded, “a Redeemer” (Stegner 1986).
The twin problems that Stegner identifi ed—overdevelopment of an 
arid environment and an unrequited faith that we can somehow engineer 
a solution to water scarcity—are even more palpable 30 years on. Yet, as 
Stegner knew full well, there will be no redeemer. There is only our capac-
ity to learn from the past, to repair the problems that we have created, 
and to place ourselves on a more sustainable future path. As California 
moves forward in the twenty-fi rst century to confront the challenges 
posed by overuse and misallocation, groundwater overdraft, ecological 
degradation, continued population growth, and the predicted eff ects of 
global warming and climate change, the responsive and dynamic man-
dates of the reasonable use doctrine will be an essential guide.
notes
1. The common law, statutory law, and constitutional law of water rights 
also contain a “benefi cial use” requirement, which means that all uses of water 
must be for a socially benefi cial use (Cal. Const. art. X, § 2; Cal. Water Code § 
1240). This chapter focuses on the reasonable use requirement because, both as 
a water policy directive and as a limitation on water rights, it is the more sig-
nifi cant of the two.
2. Although the doctrine of reasonable use was part of the common law of 
riparian and appropriative rights, the voters placed it in the Constitution in 
1928 to overturn a series of California Supreme Court decisions that prevented 
appropriators from alleging unreasonable use against riparians. The conse-
quence was to allow riparians to enjoin any nonriparian use of water that 
diminished the natural fl ow of California’s rivers, regardless of the unreasona-
bleness of the riparian’s claims. This in turn threatened the development of the 
state’s economy, which was increasingly dependent on water exported from the 
Sierra Nevada to the Bay Area, the Tulare Basin, and Southern California (Gray 
1989; Hundley 2001).
3. In City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000), the Supreme Court 
suggested that this same principle may apply to unexercised groundwater rights 
held by property owners whose lands overlie the aquifer (and hence have fi rst 
priority to its safe yield).
4. The court relied in both cases on the Water Code, § 1050, which declares 
that the SWRCB’s regulatory authority is “in furtherance of the policy con-
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tained in Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution and in all respects 
for the welfare and benefi t of the people of the state, for the improvement of 
their prosperity and their living conditions.”
5. This transfer, as well as the interplay between the reasonable use doctrine 
and water transfers, will be discussed in the fi nal section of this chapter.
6. The legislature has granted the board authority to engage in integrated 
surface and groundwater rights administration in the Scott River system, where 
the board has the power to conduct a statutory adjudication of all water rights, 
including “ground water supplies which are interconnected with the Scott 
River” (Cal. Water Code § 2500.5).
In September 2014, California governor Jerry Brown signed into law three 
bills that empower local agencies to regulate groundwater pumping: AB 1739, 
SB 1168, and SB 1319. The legislation also authorizes the SWRCB to regulate 
groundwater pumping if the board determines that (1) the local groundwater 
sustainability plan is inadequate and “is not being implemented in a manner 
that will likely achieve the sustainability goal,” and (2) “the basin is in a condi-
tion where groundwater extractions result in signifi cant depletions of intercon-
nected surface waters” (Cal. Water Code § 10735.2(a)(5)(B)(i), (ii)). The new 
law stipulates that before January 1, 2025, however, “the state board shall not 
establish an interim plan under this section to remedy a condition where the 
groundwater extractions result in signifi cant depletions of interconnected sur-
face waters” (§ 10735.8(h)). Although this legislation is an important fi rst step 
toward integrated regulation of ground and surface water resources, it does not 
alter the long-standing general legal divide between the two.
7. In May 2014, a Superior Court applied this reasoning to hold that the 
public trust doctrine may limit groundwater pumping that lowers surface fl ows 
in the Scott River and thereby harms fi sh and recreational uses (Environmental 
Law Foundation v. SWRCB, 2014). This decision is consonant with the integra-
tive and comprehensive interpretation of article X, section 2, described in the 
text.
8. The board’s forbearance of its power to divest the IID of a portion of its 
water rights was supported by the legislature’s general declaration that water 
conservation, as well as the transfer of conserved water, is a reasonable and 
benefi cial use (Water Code §§ 1011(a), (b)). The legislature also enacted a spe-
cial law to protect the IID against forfeiture or diminution of its water rights as 
a result of water conservation and to insulate the district from liability for any 
adverse eff ects on the Salton Sea that might result (§§ 1012, 1013(a)).
9. As with the IID–MWD transfer, the legislature enacted special legislation 
to facilitate the IID–SDCWA transfer (Cal. Water Code § 1013(b)–(h)).
10. In a later opinion in the case, the Federal Circuit came closer to the reason-
able use question, recognizing that article X, section 2, defi nes the property right 
in water. It held that because Casitas had not proved that the loss of the water that 
the government required to pass though the fi sh ladder had reduced the amount 
that the district could apply to benefi cial use, the district had failed to establish an 
interference with its water rights. Under California law, the court concluded, “the 
concept of benefi cial use provides an ‘overriding constitutional limitation’ on a 
party’s water rights” (Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 2013).
Lassiter - 9780520285361.indd   105 07/05/15   3:17 PM
106  |  Chapter Four
references
Blomquist, William. 1992. Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in 
Southern California. San Francisco: ICS Press.
California Court of Appeal cases
People ex rel. SWRCB v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1976).
United States v. SWRCB, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986).
Imperial Irrigation District v. SWRCB, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160 (1986).
California Trout v. SWRCB, 207 Cal. App. 3d 585 (1989).
Imperial Irrigation District v. SWRCB, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 275 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1990).
El Dorado Irrigation District v. SWRCB, 142 Cal. App. 4th 937; 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468 
(2006).
City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water District, 198 Cal. App. 4th 926, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
373 (2011).
Light v. SWRCB, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200 (2014).
California legislation
AB 1739, SB 1168, and SB 1319, California Legislature, 2013–14 Regular Session.
California Fish and Game Code § 5937.
California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, California Public Resources Code § 5093.5.
California Water Code §§ 275, 370–374, 500–535, 1011–1013, 1050, 1240, 2500.2, 
10920–10936, 10608–10608.64, 10610–10656, 10735.2(a)(5)(B)(i), (ii), 
10735.8(h), 10750–10783.2, 10800–10853, 85020–85023, 85054.
California regulations
23 California Code Regs. § 735.
California Superior Court cases
Environmental Law Foundation v. SWRCB, No. 34–2010–80000583 (Sacramento 
Supr. Ct. 2014).
California Supreme Court cases
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 383, 40 P.2d 486 (1935).
Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District 67 Cal. 2d 132, 140, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 377 (1967).
In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 358–59, 599 P.2d 
656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979).
Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 26 Cal. 3d 183, 
605 P.2d 1, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1980).
People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 605 P.2d 859, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1980).
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 443, 658 P.2d 709, 189 
Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1242, 5 P.3d 853, 99 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 294 (2000).
In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Environmental Impact Report Coordinated Proceed-
ings, 43 Cal. 4th 1143, 184 P.3d 709, 77 Cal. Rptr. 578 (2008).
Federal Court cases
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
petition for rehearing denied, 556 F.3d 1329 (2009).
Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Lassiter - 9780520285361.indd   106 07/05/15   3:17 PM
The Reasonable Use Doctrine  |  107
Federal legislation
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
California Bay-Delta Authority. 2005. Final Draft Year-4 Comprehensive Eval-
uation of the CALFED Water Use Effi  ciency Element. Sacramento: State of 
California.
Gray, Brian E. 1989. “In Search of Bigfoot: The Common Law Origins of Arti-
cle X, Section 2 of the California Constitution.” Hastings Constitutional 
Law Quarterly 17:225.
. 1994. “The Modern Era in California Water Law.” Hastings Law Jour-
nal 45:249.
. 2005. “The Uncertain Future of Water Rights in California: Refl ections 
on the Governor’s Commission Report.” McGeorge Law Review 36:43.
Gray, Brian E., Dean Misczynski, Ellen Hanak, Andrew Fahlund, Jay Lund, 
David Mitchell, and James Nachbaur. 2014. “Paying for Water in Califor-
nia: The Legal Framework.” Hastings L.J. 65:1603.
Haddad, Brent M. 2000. Rivers of Gold: Designing Markets to Allocate Water 
in California. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Hanak, Ellen, Brian Gray, Jay Lund, David Mitchell, Caitrin Chappelle, Andrew 
Fahlund, Katrina Jessoe, Josué Medellín-Azuara, Dean Misczynski, James 
Nachbaur, and Robyn Suddeth. 2014. Paying for Water in California. San 
Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.
Hanak, Ellen, Jay Lund, Ariel Dinar, Brian Gray, Richard Howitt, Jeff rey 
Mount, Peter Moyle, and Barton Thompson. 2011. Managing California’s 
Water: From Confl ict to Reconciliation. San Francisco: Public Policy Insti-
tute of California.
Hundley, Norris, Jr. 2001. The Great Thirst: Californians and Water—A His-
tory. Rev. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Littleworth, Arthur L., and Eric L. Garner. 2007. California Water II. Point 
Arena, CA: Solano Press.
Natural Resources Defense Council. 1998. Alfalfa Overview. San Francisco, 
CA.
Sax, Joseph L. 2003. “We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California His-
tory.” University of Denver Water Law Review 6: 269.
Stegner, Wallace. 1986. “Water in the West: Growing beyond Nature’s Limits.” 
Los Angeles Times, December 29.
United States Geological Survey. 2013. Land Subsidence along the Delta-
Mendota Canal in the Northern Part of the San Joaquin Valley, California, 
2003–10. Reston, VA: U.S. Government Printing Offi  ce.
Wilson, Craig M. [Delta Watermaster]. 2010. The Reasonable Use Doctrine & 
Agricultural Water Use Effi  ciency: A Report to the State Water Resources Con-
trol Board and the Delta Stewardship Council. Sacramento: State of California.
Lassiter - 9780520285361.indd   107 07/05/15   3:17 PM
